In my paper, I present and discuss Cappelen and Lepore's context sensitivity tests, which appeal to says-that reports. In Relativism and Monadic Truth (2009) Cappelen and Hawthorne criticize those tests and propose agreement-based tests instead. I argue that such tests do not fare much better. The original Cappelen and Lepore's tests presupposed a minimal notion of says-that. One might postulate a parallel notion of "thin" agreement, according to which people agree that p if they all believe the minimal proposition that p. In this sense we might say -as opposed to what Cappelen and Hawthorne say -that A and B agree that Nicola is smart, even though A thinks that she is smart because she stands way back against strong servers, while B thinks that she is smart because she invested all her money in penny stocks. The paper ends with a critical gloss concerning the case in which Joe Coach predicates tall of people who are over six-footeight and Joe Normal, who applies tall to anyone over six-foot tall. I conclude that agreement and disagreement tests are poor indicators of context sensitivity, since their result depends on the prior theoretical standpoint one adopts.
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The original tests
In their 2005 book Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore argue for semantic minimalism which is -roughly -the view that the semantic content of the sentence S is the content that all utterances of S share (the so-called minimal proposition). Minimal proposition depends on context only when the sentence contains indexical expressions, otherwise it is context insensitive. Cappelen and Lepore think that the majority of indexical expressions are contained in Kaplan's list in "Demonstratives" (Kaplan 1989 ). According to them, indexicals include the personal pronouns I, you, he, she, it, the demonstrative pronouns this, that, the adverbs here, there, now, today, yesterday, tomorrow, ago, hence(forth) and the adjectives actual, present (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 1) . To this list they add "words and aspects of words that indicate tense" (ibid.) and "the contextuals, which include common nouns like enemy, outsider, foreigner, alien, immigrant, friend, and native as well as common adjectives like foreign, local, domestic, imported, and exported" (ibid.).
1 All sentence-tokens of the sentence-type that does not contain indexicals (or has been disindexicalised) express the same minimal proposition. Thus, the sentence Rudolf has a red nose expresses the minimal proposition that Rudolf has a red nose independently of the context in which it is uttered; the sentence Rudolf has had breakfast always expresses the minimal proposition that Rudolf has had breakfast, the sentence Rudolf is ready always expresses the minimal proposition that Rudolf is ready, and so on (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 3) .
The main opponent of semantic minimalism -and the main target of Insensitive Semantics -is radical contextualism, whose proponents argue that nearly all expressions are context sensitive.
2 Radical contextualists claim that indexicals include i.a. quantifiers, comparative adjectives, propositional attitude ascriptions, knowledge attributions and moral attributions. None of the sentences Rudolf has a red nose, Rudolf has had breakfast, Rudolf is ready expresses a minimal proposition. What they express can only be established against the background of the situation in which a particular token of these sentences has been uttered. The tokens of any given sentence can be used to say so many diverse things, that there is no common core that could be called minimal proposition expressed by all. Cappelen and Lepore think that contextualists are mistaken. Indexicals are very few and far between and all context-dependence is grammatically triggered (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 144) . In order to be able to tell "true" indexicals from context insensitive expressions they designed three tests that are supposed to serve as indications of context sensitivity.
The Report test
The test says that "an expression is context sensitive only if it typically blocks inter-contextual disquotational indirect reports" (Cappelen, Lepore 2005: 88 Cappelen and Lepore argue that such a report would be true and perfectly alright. Thus, they claim that their test shows that neither ready nor red are context sensitive.
The Collective Description test
The test says that "context sensitive expressions block collective descriptions" (Cappelen, Lepore 2005: 99 
The critique of the tests
The tests have not met with favorable reaction. One thing that was noted is that even if the tests worked they would demonstrate only that ready, enough, tall, etc., are not context sensitive in the same way in which Kaplan's indexicals are. In other words, they would not show that they are context insensitive (see e.g. Bezuidenhout 2006 , Hawthorne 2006 , Recanati 2006 . More importantly, the general feeling is that the tests do not work, i.e. they do not give the results that Cappelen and Lepore wanted them to deliver. Exactly what is their result is a matter of controversy. There are almost as many views as there are many commentators. Cappelen and Lepore are alone in thinking that only indexicals from Kaplan's list pass all three tests. Charles Travis (2006) is convinced that even a verb like grunts passes all the tests. Zoltán Szabó (2006) argues that proper names pass the three tests, while quantifiers pass the Collective Description test and the IDC/RCSA test. Anne Bezuidenhout (2006) writes that ready passes all three tests, while even the token precise and context insensitive weights 80 kg passes the Collective Description test. François Recanati (2006) explicitly argues that ready passes the report test 5 and in all probability he would claim that it also passes the other two tests. Sarah Jane Leslie (2007) argues that expressions like enough, ready, every, it's raining and tall pass the third test but do not pass the first and the second. John Hawthorne (2006) is convinced that left and nearby in some contexts pass the second and the third test, but fail the first one. According to him, neither left nor nearby block intercontextual disquotational indirect reports, but both sometimes block collective descriptions. What is clear after this reaction to the tests is that they have not been designed properly. Nobody has backed Cappelen and Lepore's claim that the tests give the desired results. 7 As we have seen, the opinions as to the actual results vary. The fact that people from the same -contextualist -camp do not agree about the outcome of Cappelen and Lepore's tests, seems to show that there is something wrong with the tests themselves. The obvious culprit is the notion says that which figures so prominently in them. The locution says that is notoriously ambiguous. Minimalists tend to read it narrowly so that it means roughly literally says that, whereas contextualists read it much more broadly. Since minimalists think that what A says in the context of exam preparation is that John is ready, period, they will argue that ready does not block inter-contextual reports. Contextualists on the other hand claim that if A says John is ready in the context of exam preparation what he says is that John is ready for the exam, so obviously they would not allow inter-contextual reporting of the kind mentioned by Cappelan and Lepore. It is therefore clear that such tests cannot be used for testing because their result is slanted by theoretical assumptions with which we start them.
In response to the critique, Cappelen and Lepore (2006) argued that passing of the tests was never meant to be understood as a necessary condition for being context sensitive.
8 Tests only provide evidence that certain expressions are context sensitive. It has to be pointed out, however, that in the book tests are formulated in a way that suggest otherwise. They write, for instance, "an expression is context sensitive only if it typically blocks inter-contextual disquotational reports" (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 88 According to them, "S exhibits Easiness if true disquotational says-that reports for S are easy to achieve across a wide range of environments" (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 34) .
Thus, the Report test says in fact that expressions that are easy to report intercontextually by means of disquotational says-that reports are context insensitive. Cappelen and Hawthorne agree with Cappelen and Lepore that sentences with I, here and yesterday do not exhibit Easiness and hence are context sensitive. As we have seen above, Hawthorne (2006) has demonstrated that since left and nearby fail the Collective Description test, the defender of this test has either to insist that they are context insensitive, contrary to common intuitions, or else to abandon the test. Now, Cappelen and Hawthorne argue that although left and nearby do exhibit Easiness, they are context sensitive, for the fact that Easiness obtains for these expressions does not provide "significant evidence against a hypothesis of context dependent semantic value in these cases" (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 39) . 9 As a result, they feel compelled to reject the inference from Easiness to context insensitivity. Since left and nearby are easy and context sensitive, "something is deeply wrong with the relevant application of Easiness" (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 39) . Cappelen and Hawthorne explain the context sensitivity of left and nearby by claiming that those words are parasites: "whatever one's location and orientation, one can use 'nearby' and 'left' in a way that is parasitic on features of the environment of the subjects that one is reporting on" (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 40) . 10 The authors of Relativism and Monadic Truth argue further that once we realize the existence of parasites Easiness is discredited as an indication of context 9 They also consider ready, smart and enough and notice that someone who thinks that reports containing these expressions exhibit a high degree of Easiness is committed to semantic contents (such as that Nicola is smart, that Naomi has had enough, that Jill was ready), which seem non-propositional, since they are non-specific with respect to certain parameters (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 52) . The claim that the semantic values of declarative sentences relative to contexts of utterance are propositions is one of the five theses which together make up the Simple View, whose defense is the main objective of Relativism and Monadic Truth. insensitivity and "there is no obvious way to effectively use [the report test] for anti-contextualist purposes" (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 42) . The Collection test is also dismissed, for they argue as well that we have to reject the inference from easy collection to context insensitivity. If A (in Sopot) says: Naomi went to a nearby beach, and B (in Dębki) says: Naomi went to a nearby beach, then C may report this correctly by saying: A and B said that Naomi went to a nearby beach. Again, nearby is easy to collect but "obviously context sensitive". Cappelen and Hawthorne notice that easy collection can be explained by the appeal to lambda abstraction, just as the various readings of John loves his mother and Bill does, too are. On one reading -not of particular interest for us here -this sentence says that both John and Bill love John's mother, but on the other reading it says that John loves his mother and Bill loves his. The second reading we get by analyzing loves his mother as x (x loves x's mother). Similarly A and B said that Naomi went to a nearby beach can be analyzed as:
A and B x (x said that Naomi went to a beach nearby (to x) ).
A similar story might be told concerning left:
A (facing B): Naomi turned left. B (facing A): Naomi turned left. C: A and B said that Naomi turned left.
C's report may be analysed as A and B x (x said that Naomi turned left (relative to x) ).
Thus, lambda abstraction explains why nearby and ready are easy to collect. Analyzed in this way the sentence A and B said that Naomi went to a nearby beach means that both A and B have the property of being x such that x said that Naomi went to a beach nearby to x. So it can be read as saying that A said that Naomi went to a beach nearby to A, while B said that Naomi went to a beach nearby to B. Therefore, A and B said that Naomi went to a nearby beach is compatible with the view that 'There is a beach nearby' varies in content between contexts of utterance and so sits happily with the view that 'There is a beach nearby' is semantically context sensitive. (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 47) Thus, the Collective Description test cannot be used as an indicator of context sensitivity.
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The agreement-and disagreement-based tests
After criticizing the says-that tests used by Cappelen and Lepore, Cappelen and Hawthorne offer "new diagnostics for sameness and difference of content" (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 54) : new tests which are based on agreement and disagreement. They propose three formulations (ibid.):
Agree-1: Let u be a sincere utterance of S by A in C and u' a sincere utterance of 'not-S' by B in C'. If from a third context C'' they cannot be correctly reported by 'A and B disagree whether S', then S is semantically context sensitive. Meanwhile, if from a third context C'' they can be correctly reported by 'A and B disagree whether S', that is evidence that S is semantically invariant across C, C', and C''.
Agree-2:
Take two sincere utterances u and u' by A and B of a sentence S in contexts C and C'. If from a third context C'' they can be reported by an utterance of 'A and B agree that S', then that is evidence that S is semantically invariant across C, C', and C''. Meanwhile, if the report in C'' is incorrect, that is evidence that S is not semantically invariant across C, C', and C''.
Agree-3:
Let an A-Triple for a sentence S be a triple consisting of two sincere utterances u and u' of S by A and B respectively in distinct contexts C and C', and one utterance of 'A and B agree that S' in a third context C''. If, for all A-triples involving S, the last member is true, then that is evidence that S is semantically invariant.
As we can see, now the idea is that inter-contextual agreement or disagreement is evidence of context insensitivity, whereas lack of such agreement or disagreement is evidence of context sensitivity. Let us look again at the nearby-beach and turnedleft cases described above.
A (in Sopot): Naomi went to a nearby beach. B (in Dębki): Naomi went to a nearby beach. C: A and B said that Naomi went to a nearby beach. C: A and B agree that Naomi went to a nearby beach.  Cappelen and Hawthorne argue that saying that A and B agree that Naomi went to a nearby beach and that Naomi turned left in the above circumstances is intuitively incorrect. 11 Thus, it is claimed that the agreement/disagreement-based tests give better results than says-that tests. Intuitively, left and nearby are context sensitive and the tests appealing to agreement (or disagreement) give answers that are intuitively correct. Case One: A sincerely utters 'Nicola is smart. She stands way back against strong servers' as a comment solely on her tennis skills; B sincerely utters 'Nicola is not smart. She invested all her money in penny stocks' as a comment solely on her business acumen. The report 'A and B disagree about whether Nicola is smart' is intuitively incorrect.
Case Two: A sincerely utters 'Nicola is ready. She has her coat on, so we can leave now' and B says 'Nicola is not ready. She hasn't studied enough to take the exam tomorrow'. The report 'A and B disagree about whether Nicola is ready' is intuitively incorrect.
According to their proponents, the tests give the right results: both ready and smart are context sensitive, for the relevant agreement/disagreement reports are intuitively incorrect.
Critique: "thin" agreement
The agreement/disagreement-based tests are supposed to be an improvement on the former says-that tests. One cannot fail to notice, however, that that the appeal to the notion of agreement and disagreement is as suspect as the appeal to the notion of says-that. Both notions are notoriously ambiguous and elicit conflicting intuitions. Both are theory-laden in a sense that each theorist uses them with their own theoretical assumptions. For instance, the original Cappelen and Lepore's tests presuppose a minimal notion of "says-that". Only for such a minimal notion is it 11 In fact, Cappelen and Hawthorne write that those reports are "obviously false" (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 72) . 12 Lambda abstraction is not applicable here, because agree is non-distributive in normal contexts (unlike says that). See Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009: 74n) . The Agreement-Based Tests for Context Sensitivity plausible to say that the report A said that John and Bill are ready in a situation where A said first John is ready in the context of exam preparation and next he said Bill is ready in the context in which dressing up for dinner was discussed. Anyone who uses a more loaded notion of "says that" will object to such a report. Now, it seems to me that someone who uses a minimal notion of says-that might postulate a parallel notion of minimal agreement. According to the notion of "thin" agreement people agree that p if they all believe the minimal proposition that p. Minimal agreement will not help with reports containing expressions like I or yesterday: It seems to me that it is at least arguable that such a report is intuitively correct assuming that agreeing is understood in a minimal way.
13 A and B agree that John is ready, even though they think that he is ready for different endeavors.
Consider now again the cases of smart Nicola and ready Nicola. The cases were described by Cappelen and Hawthorne in great detail and in a different way than other cases discussed earlier by Cappelen and Lepore. Since the result of the test is to a great degree dependent on intuitions, the way in which the cases are described is significant. A more detailed description may be considered unfair, for it may influence intuitive judgments. Let us strip the case of unnecessary details and describe it like the other cases before: Then the report A and B disagree about whether Nicola is ready sounds intuitively correct (or at least it is not obvious that it is incorrect).
14 The upshot of my critique is this. The agreement-based tests are just as bad as says-that tests for the obvious reason that agree (and disagree) is ambiguous just as says that was. A person who uses a "thick" notion of agreement and disagreement will get different results from the tests that a person who uses a "thin" notion of agreement and disagreement. Moreover, any decision which notion is the right one is bound to be ad hoc. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009: 61-2) notice that there are complications for their view. One of these complications is the following: Suppose A and B both utter S (or are disposed to utter S). In so doing A asserts (or would assert) P1 and B asserts (or would assert) P2. Suppose further that both P1 and P2 imply a third proposition, P. Now suppose that S in the reporter's mouth The Agreement-Based Tests for Context Sensitivity expresses the proposition P. Then the truth of 'A and B agree that S' can be supported by the original speeches, even though their propositional content is different.
The case of Joe Coach and Joe Normal
Hence, the agreement-test is not fool-proof. One might get a true agreement-report in a case in which there is no sameness of content. 15 As an example they consider the following case of Joe Coach and Joe Normal. Joe Coach is a basketball coach who predicates tall of someone only when that person is over six-foot and eight inches tall, while Joe Normal applies tall to anyone over six-foot tall. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009: 62) argue that:
It will not seem very natural for the observer to claim that Joe Coach and Joe Normal disagree about whether a person who is six-foot-four is tall. But it will seem quite natural to claim that Joe Coach and Joe Normal both agree that a person who is seven-foot-tall is tall.
Thus, the reports concerning agreement in this case are correct, whereas reports concerning disagreement are incorrect. Cappelen and Hawthorne offer a "tentative diagnosis" to explain this predicament: "in trying to describe Joe Coach and Joe Normal simultaneously, the reporter uses 'tall' in a way that is deferential to the joint context of the two reportees" (ibid.). Let us indicate tall as being used by the reporter as tall j . According to Cappelen and Hawthorne, the reporter uses the predicate tall j in such a way that it is true of someone if tall as used by Joe Coach is true of that person and tall as used by Joe Normal is also true of that person, whereas tall j is false of someone if tall as used by Joe Coach is false of that person and tall as used by Joe Normal is also false of that person. Thus, we may correctly say: Joe Normal and Joe Coach agree that a person who is seven-foot-tall is tall j . However, Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009: 63) claim that: it is not acceptable to say that Joe Normal and Joe Coach disagree about whether a person who is six-foot-four-tall is tall j , since that is a case where the extension is deliberately treated as altogether vague.
The first thing to notice is that the extension of tall j is not vague at all, contrary to what Cappelen and Hawthorne say. According to the meaning of tall j :
"A person who is over six-foot-eight-tall is tall j " and "A person who is under six-foot-tall is not tall j " are true, while Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.2 (2011)/Special Issue on Context and Contextualism: 241-258 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0013-6 results, because cases involving tall, ready and enough clearly indicate agreement (or disagreement) among the participants.
